The Market Doesn't Care How "Fantastic" Your Stocks Are
The Roman philosopher Seneca wasn’t talking about the stock market when he wrote that “Time discovers truth,”but he could have been. In the long run a stock price will reflect a company’s (true) intrinsic value. In the short run the pricing is basically random. Here are two real-life examples.
Let’s say you had the smarts to buy Microsoft in November 1992. It would have been a brilliant decision in the long run — the software giant’s stock has gone up many-fold since. But nine months later, in August 1993, that call did not look so brilliant: Microsoft shares had declined 25% in less than a year. In fact, it would have taken you 18 months, until May 1994, for this purchase to break even. Eighteen months of dumbness?
In the early 1990s, the PC industry was still in its infancy. Microsoft’s DOS and Windows operating systems were de facto standards. Outside of Apple Macs and a tiny fraction of computers, every computer came preinstalled with DOS and Windows. Microsoft had a pristine balance sheet and a brilliant co-founder and CEO in Bill Gates who would turn mountains upside-down to make sure the company succeeded. The above sentence is infested with hindsight — after all, that was almost 30 years ago. But Microsoft clearly had an incredible moat, which became wider with every new PC sold and every new software program written to run on Windows.
Here is another example: GoPro is a maker of video cameras used by surfers, skiers, and other extreme sports enthusiasts. If you had bought the stock soon after it went public, in 2014, you would have paid $40 a share for a $5.5 billion–market-cap company earning about $100 million a year — a price-earnings ratio of about 55. Your impatience would, however, have been rewarded: The stock more than doubled in just a few short months, hitting $90.
Would it have been a good decision to buy GoPro? The company makes a great product — I own one. But GoPro has no protective “moat” around its business. None. Most components that go into its cameras are commodities. There are no barriers to entry into the specialized video camera segment. Most important, there are no switching costs for consumers. Investors who bought GoPro after its IPO paid a huge premium for the promise of much higher earnings from a company that might or might not be around five years later.